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Marine Turtle Newsletter 78:7-13, © 1997

GUEST EDITORIAL: INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION AND CONSERVATION OF SEA TURTLES

Although its paternity is unclear to many conservationists, the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles was conceived from a union between a regional fishing industry, the Latin American Organization for Fisheries Development (OLDEPESCA), and dozens of governments in the Western Hemisphere. It is a consummation of Section 609 of U.S. Public Law 101-162, which invokes the conservation of sea turtles as a relatively small, yet significant, part of the gargantuan problem of bycatch destruction during commercial shrimp (prawn) trawling (NRC, 1990; Plé, 1990a,b; Alverson et al., 1994; Weber et al., 1995). Passed in November 1989, P.L. 101-162 has explicit international ramifications: to be "certified" and avoid an embargo by the U.S. Government, shrimp exporting nations must employ conservation measures for sea turtles comparable to those used in the U.S. (see Plé, 1990a, for the precise text).

Reports on the first and second meetings of the Convention, organized in México, and its potential conservation value (Donnelly, 1995, 1996), were met by a deafening lack of interest within the international community of sea turtle specialists (including this writer!). Yet, by the second intergovernmental meeting of the Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles in the Western Hemisphere (as it was then called), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations was intimately involved. At this meeting, FAO provided financial support, as well as technical and legal assistance, which continued throughout the remainder of the Convention's gestation.

The initial disinterest is understandable, given the long and beleaguered history of pernicious effects on sea turtles and their habitats from commercial activities -- notably, the shrimp industry. Furthermore, the covenant was begotten after decades of "delay and denial" by diverse sectors of the U.S. Government, oft consenting to the interests of a powerful minority, the commercial fishing industry (NRC, 1990; Weber et al., 1995). Indeed, at the time of its legalization, P.L. 101-162 was analyzed as having significant uncertainties and risks (Plé, 1990a,b). In February 1996, five months after the second intergovernmental meeting of the Convention, this regional initiative was perceived by many delegations and sea turtle conservationists to be a poorly-veiled attempt to support the commercial shrimp industry, under the guise of protecting sea turtles. It was, after all, intended as a mechanism to get around the need for certification and protect the interests of the shrimp fishery, an enterprise which manages thousands of millions of dollars annually, derived from the exploitation of common resources.

As there is already a dizzying number of international instruments which, in one way or another, are relevant to sea turtle conservation, why is one more treaty necessary, especially coming with this less than attractive pedigree? Are we just addressing symptoms one more time, when the fundamental issue of wanton bycatch destruction, and concomitant decimation of "non-target" fisheries and deprivation to small-scale fishers is constantly buried under the rhetoric of commerce, "free trade", modernization, nationalism, progress and that most special of magic shibboleths: "sustainable development" (Alverson et al., 1994; Fairlie, 1995; Frazier, 1997)?

The suspicions of sea turtle specialists regarding commercial activities are shared not only by other conservationists, but also by those involved in the advancement of human rights, development and other humanitarian issues. While perhaps not always articulated in the most fashionable of terms, the concerns of the conservation and development communities are solidly supported by recent analyses in other disciplines, notably political science and economics. In a world run predominantly by corporate lawyers and accountants, in which the individual treasuries of hundreds of transnational corporations far exceed the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of all but a few "sovereign" (sic) states, it is necessary to question the links between governments, industries and their agents (Korten, 1995). This is even more so now that the "post-modern", "neo-liberal", "globalized" economy is managed by organizations which are accountable only to a tiny elite of multinational investors and which have the capacity to invalidate decisions of democratically elected governments (Fairlie, 1995; Korten, 1995; UNRISD and Banson, 1995; Bhaduri and Nayyar, 1996; Giddens, 1996; Nova and Sforza-Roderick, 1997). Hence, when government representatives develop schemes with international industries and their various agents, basic questions need to be answered: Who is represented in these alliances? For the benefit of whom? At whose cost? Who will be accountable for any problems generated by the actions taken? What are the likely medium- and long-term consequences of these alliances on society and the environment? Until recently, these, and many other, fundamental doubts surrounded the draft Convention.

A major turning point occurred from 25 to 27 February 1996, just prior to the 16th Annual Symposium on Sea Turtle Biology and Conservation (held at Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, USA) the third consecutive year that the Latin American Reunion had met in this venue. During these three days, more than 40 sea turtle specialists from 13 nations in the Americas met to discuss common issues; one of the main items of discussion was the draft Convention. Five authorities in sea turtle conservation -- one from Brazil, three from México (one each from the governmental, university and NGO communities) and one from the USA -- who had participated in the second meeting of the Convention provided detailed analyses and comments, pro and con. Also in the meeting were other national and international leaders in sea turtle conservation from the Caribbean and Latin American. After lengthy discussions, it was unanimously agreed that, despite certain weaknesses and drawbacks, the Convention represented a potentially valuable instrument for strengthening and coordinating sea turtle conservation, both nationally and internationally (Frazier, 1996a).

Together with a manifestation of support for the idea of a regional convention for sea turtle conservation, this group of Latin American specialists drafted a series of basic recommendations for the future development of the treaty. One of the first points was that sea turtle specialists should be included in the deliberations and workings of the Convention; the last recommendation was that resource users (the shrimp industry in particular) should provide financial support for the costs of management and conservation -- the concept of "user pays." After minor adjustments to the language, these recommendations were passed as a formal Resolution during the Plenary of the 16th Annual Symposium on Sea Turtle Biology and Conservation (Frazier, 1996a).

It is noteworthy that this community was supportive of something from which they had been, to a great extent, excluded: the deliberations of the early phases of the Convention. It is also fundamental to understand that the collective experience of the participants in the 1996 Latin American Reunion did not derive from academic discourses on esoteric/political positions in the intriguing world of conservation; it was not constructed in the rarefied atmospheres of academic and commercial institutions, nor was it sponsored by wealthy patrons. Instead, this experience has grown from decades of unsung dedication by people who daily confront terrible problems of economic and political instability, yet somehow they are able to work within their respective systems and advance the goals of sea turtle conservation. Personal sacrifice is routine, and, as a matter of course, much of the sea turtle conservation carried out by these people forms an integral part of other more complex issues, such as community development, marine and coastal management, and public education. The role of this author in the meeting was to moderate and compile the information generated, and later distribute it to the participants (Frazier, 1996a); the consensus of the assembly was the mandate for his opinion and actions.

Another crucial event in the ontogeny of this Convention was the "Simposio Internacional para la Conservación de Tortugas Marinas" convened on 22 and 23 April 1996 in Caracas, Venezuela, immediately prior to the third intergovernmental meeting of the Convention. The symposium was organized by the Venezuelan Servicio Autónomo de los Recursos Pesqueros y Acuícolas (SARPA) of the Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría (MAC), and the Fundación Científica los Roques. The full participation of industry, NGO and scientific communities during the preparations, the catalytic organizational skills of Lic. Hedelvy Guada, with the active ingredients of sea turtle authorities from Brazil, México and Venezuela provided the chemistry for a much-needed integration of sea turtle specialists into the workings of the Convention. The pre-Convention Simposio furnished delegates with basic information on sea turtles, as well as an opportunity for them to dialogue with specialists. The Resolution of the 16th Annual Symposium, as well as the results and recommendations of the just-finalized Simposio Internacional, were provided to the delegates; and these were discussed officially and publicly, at several junctures, during the intergovernmental negotiations. The host delegation took the lead in pressing for more scientific involvement. In addition, the Convention in Caracas was open to NGOs and local students of sea turtles, who attended as observers.

The draft Convention was not approved in Caracas (fortunately!); yet, the tide had changed. Instead of sole, or preponderant, representation by the fisheries industry, the scientific and conservation communities were being heard and their opinions were integral parts of the deliberations. With the mandate of the Latin American specialists, and the impetus of the advances in Caracas, a concerted effort was made to provide the delegations with detailed comments on the Caracas draft, and lobby further in favor of including scientific opinion (Frazier, 1996b).

The stage was set for the fourth, and final, intergovernmental meeting in Salvador, Brazil, from 3 to 5 September 1996. Until this point, the Brazilian Delegation had not been openly supportive of the Convention; but in Salvador they took the lead to revise the entire convention document, and in the words of one of the key players, to "make something good out of something dirty." The Peruvian Delegation, under the leadership of one of the prime authors of the United Nations Law of the Sea, also provided critical support in the detailed revision. Although some delegates may have felt that these extended discussions (beginning all over again, starting from the title, even revising past accords!) were a strategic ploy, there could be no doubt in the sincerity to mold the Convention into an instrument truly useful for sea turtle conservation. Once the assembled delegations had revised each of the issues about which they were concerned, the final draft was accepted, and the head of the host delegation (officially assigned to the economic section in the Brazilian diplomatic corps) made a closing speech, breaking slightly with protocol, but speaking with deep conviction and pride. Using as a positive example their national sea turtle program, Projecto TAMAR, she accentuated the need for international cooperation to effectively conserve these "magnificent, migratory animals." Clearly, the information provided in Caracas, and through the various other scientific inputs, had made an indelible impact: sea turtle conservation is indeed consequential, important enough not to be left to the whim of multinational commerce; recognized as regional resources, sea turtles need to be managed through regional accords.

The stated reason for the Convention in the Salvador draft stands much as it has been from the start: Article II reads: "The objective of this Convention is to promote the protection, conservation and recovery of sea turtle populations and of the habitats on which they depend, based on the best available scientific evidence, taking into account the environmental, socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of the Parties." However, the final document has clearly evolved from the first draft, and there are numerous major improvements (Somma, 1996). It is no longer a "TED (turtle excluder device) treaty", but takes into account the diversity and complexity of problems involved. Conservation and management of habitat are given central, and recurring, importance; e.g., Annex II, "Protection and Conservation of Habitats", has been added. The issue of subsistence use of sea turtles was resolved to the satisfaction of the delegations from the nations where these practices are fundamental (Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Suriname).

In terms of mechanics, the Convention is open for signing from 1 December 1996 until 31 December 1998. At least eight nations must ratify it before it will come into force; and at the date of this writing, six countries have signed (on the following dates): USA (13/XII/96); Venezuela (16/XII/96); Costa Rica (31/I/97); Nicaragua (4/III/97); Brazil (21/III/97); and PerPound (8/IV/97). México has not signed as of this writing. Venezuela is the Depository, and as such has invited other nations in the Americas to subscribe to and ratify the Convention. In addition to almost 40 countries in the Americas, it is open to France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, because of their territorial possessions in the region. Once the Convention comes into force, those countries that are present at the first meeting of the Parties will establish operational details (such as whether or not there will be a Secretariat and, if so, which organization will serve); procedural rules for the Convention and its committees, as well as the composition of both the Consultative Committee and Scientific Committee will also be instituted.

Not surprisingly, the final document shows the signs of being the product of a committee, with various "conceptual patches." More alarming is the fact that there are still significant vestiges of the original "TED treaty": despite its laudable Preamble and noble objective, there is still a heavy bias on TEDs, and deep in the heart of the Convention is Article XV, "Trade Measures." To be sure, Article XV, which champions unrestricted commerce, was the reason for failure at the Caracas meeting, and it was the final and most delicate part of the negotiations in Salvador. Significantly, when Somma (1996), from the Office of Protected Resources at the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service, reported on the outstanding points resolved at Salvador, she listed first the use of trade measures -- not other issues which occurred earlier in the negotiations or in the text and that deal directly with the conservation of sea turtles and their habitats. Indeed, P.L. 101-162 is now before the World Trade Organization, which will decide on the relative importance of unrestricted trade versus conservation of shared sea turtle resources (Schoenberger, 1997).

What does this Convention mean to the conservation of sea turtles? Some of the basic concerns are: Will the "Scientific Committee" have the authority and autonomy to act without political pressure, and how effective will it be in getting "the best available scientific information" into the core of discussions taking place in what is unabashedly a political arena, with enormous financial interests at stake? Will the right of any Party to unilaterally decide if they are going to allow domestic, "subsistence" consumption of sea turtles be consistent with the urgently needed regional cooperation in the conservation of these migratory species, resources shared among the peoples and nations of the region? As there are no sanctions or other means of enforcement, if a Party does not comply with the terms of the Convention, what can be done about it? (The continual inability of the U.S. Government to protect sea turtles, notably the critically endangered Kemp's Ridley, in U.S. waters jumps to mind; and throughout the region there are countless other examples.) Will adequate funding and support be provided, or will this be just one more "paper convention"? Will resource exploiters contribute to resource conservation? If a Secretariat is chosen, which organization will it be, and will it truly represent the Objective of the Convention? Despite its title, will this Convention be used mainly as an instrument for unrestricted commerce or will it truly support the conservation of sea turtles? How can we ensure that the Convention will strengthen the complex and urgently needed measures to conserve endangered, migratory marine turtles, as well as protect the rights of small-scale fishers: to keep if from being a ploy for concentrating yet more power and resources in big business?

Obviously the Convention is imperfect, and there are many unknowns. As a Brazilian colleague says: "Those people who do nothing, don't get criticized", and not surprisingly this western Hemisphere initiative has its detractors. For example, the results of the meeting in Salvador were hardly known to the general sea turtle community when the Convention was disparagingly attacked on the INTERNET. The tirade, ostensibly in support of subsistence fishers, came from specialists in crocodile farming, residents of the Old World who have not been involved in the regional processes described above, but who are contracted by Japanese interests to facilitate the supply of seemingly limitless resource demands -- namely, sea turtle products -- of that island nation (see Groombridge and Luxmore, 1989).

Nonetheless, despite the uncertainties and detractions, there are reasons for hope. The author is convinced from personal communications that key people in all of the delegations that have now signed are truly committed to sea turtle conservation and to using the Convention to that end. According to the Chief Liaison Officer, FAO (Lizarraga, in litt.), this Convention was proposed within the context of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995), a document of incalculable value if ever there is going to be an intelligent relationship between humans and aquatic resources. Because sea turtles serve as "flagship species", "ambassadors of the oceans", this Convention is in many ways a test case. Here are both the usual difficulties in international cooperation, and the tremendous challenge of injecting responsibility and accountability into industrialized fisheries, for decades characterized by their level of irresponsibility, damaging to both the environment and to societies (Bailey, 1985; Bailey and Jentoft, 1990; Ludwig et al., 1993; Dyer and McGoodwin, 1994; Fairlie, 1995; Heywood, 1995; Weber et al., 1995; Masood, 1997).

Hopefully an issue as complex as the conservation of shared living marine resources can be accomplished by focusing on charismatic sea turtles. Perhaps, just perhaps, if the world society can agree for once to be less damaging and more rational in its relationship to these ambassadors of the oceans, it will be possible to extend successful procedures to less charismatic, but no less endangered and desecrated living marine resources. The test of the acceptance of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the implementation of the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles is before us. However, to this writer's mind, the critical question underlying these challenges is not just about the fate of this Convention, but a deeper concern: has our species been correctly named Homo sapiens sapiens ("doubly wise, bipedal primate")?

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JACK FRAZIER, Centro de Investigación y de Estudios Avanzados del IPN (CINVESTAV), Unidad Mérida, A.P. 73 "Cordemex", Mérida C.P. 97310, Yucatán, MEXICO.